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PAST AS PROLOGUE: OLD AND NEW FEMINISMS
(-Mg'artha Caamalas*
1. THE BIG Three FEMINISMS: CONTINUING EFFECTS -159
11. THE NEW THREE FEMINISMS: COMPLEXITY
MEETS LAW - 165
111. THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
Two SAFE PREDICTIONS -172
As historians know, the process of peering into the past is not sim-
ply an act of discovery, but an active process of reconstruction. To try to
understand where we are, we try to make sense of where we have been.
What is most striking to me is that the past is never really over. Each
"1stage" of feminist legal theory-and each brand or strand of femi-
nism-stays alive and is never completely replaced by newer approaches.
When I first attempted to synthesize the field of Feminist Legal
Theory for a treatise I was writing at the end of the twentieth century, I
thought it would be useful to think chronologically and to analyze the
major developments of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.' I started with the
1 970s because that decade was the moment when second-wave femi-
nism began to find its way into the law. To say that feminist legal theory
began in the 1 970s is, of course, inaccurate-the term Feminist Legal
Theory (and its predecessor, Feminist Jurisprudence) did not emerge
until nearly the 1980s,' when the field had developed sufficiently to give
us the space to theorize about the relationship between gender and law.
Nevertheless, when I looked at the shape of the field at that time, I
crudely divided feminist legal theory into three stages roughly corre-
sponding to the preceding decades: the equality stage of the 1970s, the
difference stage of the 1980s, and the diversity stage of the 1990s.
Liberal feminism dominated the 1970s with its emphasis on formal
Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
Many thanks to Barbara Schwabauer and Katie Johnson for their fine research assis-
tance.
1. See MARnm-t CHI-tLss~, INTRODUCTION To FEMINIST LEGAL TIIEoRY 15-22 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing three stages of feminist legal theory).
2. The phrase "feminist jurisprudence" was purportedly first used in 1978 at a confer-
ence celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of women graduates at Harvard Law
School. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 193 (1989-90). Many writers now prefer the term "feminist
legal theory" because it does not carry the quasi-scientific connotations of the term
"jurisprudence."
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equality and the similarities between men and women.' In the difference
stage of the 1980s, both dominance feminism (a.k.a. radical feminism)
and cultural feminism (a.k.a. relational feminism) entered the legal dis-
course, as the critically important scholarship of Catharine MacKinnon
and Carol Gilligan captivated feminist legal writing! In their own dis-
tinctive ways, each of these theories offered a critique of the limitations
of formal equality and liberal feminism by emphasizing differences be-
tween men and women. By the 1990s, the frame shifted from
comparing men and women to noticing the very different social posi-
tions of specific subgroups of women and to thinking more deeply
about diversity among women. Anti-essentialist or intersectional femi-
nism emerged at this time, with its concentration on analyzing other
important dimensions of identity, such as race, ethnicity, and sexual ori-
entation and their interconnections with gender!
It is much more difficult to describe feminist legal theory in this
century. For this essay, I have borrowed from Rosalind Dixor~s terrific
2008 article in which she canvasses the last four decades and divides le-
gal feminism into "older" femninisms and "newer" femin isms. The older
feminisms-which I will call the "Big Three"-are liberal, dominance,
and cultural feminism. The newer femninisms also come in threes: partial
agency (or sex-positive) feminism, intersectional (or anti-essentialist)
feminism, and postmodern/poststrucrural feminism.7 I will call them the
"New Three." The major difference between Dixon's taxonomy and my
three stages of feminist legal theory is Dixon's astute positioning of the
Big Three feminisms as foundational theories that have been taken up
by mainstream scholars beyond feminist circles. Dixon also presents a
more refined description of contemporary legal feminist thought, going
beyond intersectional feminism to add two new strands of feminist the-
ory, sex-positive feminism and postmodern feminism, that have come
8
into their own in this century.
3. See GH~ALLAS, supra note 1, at 23-38.
4. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURtSES ON LIFE AND
U~w (1987); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
5. See Cain, supra note 2; Kimberi6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex. A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essential-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
6. Rosaind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARv. J. L. &
GENDER 277 (2008).
7. See id. at 282-86.
8. See id. at 282-83 (sex positive feminism) (citing Kathyrn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux:
Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REy. 304 (1995);
Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101
Vol. 17:157158
2010] OLD AND NEW FEMINISMS15
I use Dixons taxonomy as a map to locate the scholarly contribu-
tions of todays panelists and to theorize a bit about the present state of
feminist legal theory. At the end of this essay, I will briefly glimpse into
the future of feminist legal theory and mention two promising lines of
emerging scholarship, masculinities theories and social justice feminism,
that demonstrate the capacity of feminist legal theory to generate new
insights for a new generation.
1. THE BIG Three FEMINISMS: CONTINUING EFFECTS
To demonstrate that the past is never really over, let me put on a
polyester pants suit and travel back to the 1 970s. The story of the 1970s
is still the most familiar. Liberal feminism came onto the scene with its
demands for equal access and equal treatment of men and women. The
central theme was providing legal and cultural support for the so-called
"cnontraditional" woman, particularly the woman breaking into male-
dominated domains, in blue collar jobs, white collar professions, and
elite universities. The line of cases in the United States Supreme Court
that dismantled gender classifications in the law-those equal protection
cases litigated by women's rights lawyers such as Ruth Bader
Ginsburg'-were all about getting rid of "separate spheres" ideology and
challenging traditional gender roles.'0 Although this was also the decade
that produced Roe v. Wade," there was a greater emphasis on bread-and-
butter issues, what we would now call economic justice. Perhaps because
I am old enough to have been around then, I tend to resist the facile
idea that 1 970s feminism was inherently assimilationist and did little to
challenge male norms or male institutions. It did then and I think it still
does.
In case you thought the 1970s were over, take a look at Lilly
Ledbetter, the plaintiff in the infamous case decided by the Supreme
Court in 2007. 12 Ledbetter's claim was a l97Os-style demand for "equal
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001); Id. at 284-85 (postmodern feminism) (citing JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990);
Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
I-L~v. L. REV. 1045 (1992)); see also Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a "Big
Love" Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 20 10) (discussing the liberal shift
of sex-positive theorists).
9. See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the
Law, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REIP. 73 (1989).
10. See Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worls, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of
Women's History, 751J. Ams. HIsT. 9 (1988).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
20101 159
160 ~MICHIGAN JOURN L OF GENDER & LAW [o.1:5
pay for equal work." Ledbetter worked as a supervisor for nineteen years
at a Goodyear plant in Gadsden, Alabama. For most of the time, she
was the only woman in her position. Although she started out making
the same salary as the male super-visors, she received a series of lower-
than-average raises from her male managers, whom she claimed
discriminated against her because she was a woman. By the time she
took early retirement, her pay was 15-40 percent lower than her male
counterparts', a disparity that would carry over into her retirement years.
Ledbetter succeeded in convincing an Alabama jury that she was a
victim of intentional sex-based wage discrimination. However, the
United States Supreme Court took her entire award away, ruling that
her claim was time-barred and that she should have sued years before
when she was first given a raise that was tainted by sex discrimination.'
The highly formalistic 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Alito, was blind
to the realities of the workplace and to the situation of working women.
Ledbetter did not even know she was paid less than her male counter-
parts until just before she retired, when she received an anonymous note
divulging the pay schedule at the plant."4 Like most companies, Good-
year kept its salary schedule confidential and strongly discouraged
employees from discussing their salaries. The Court's ruling required
Ledbetter to sue before she had concrete evidence of a pay disparity, and
before that disparity had built up to one sizeable enough to be worth
suing over. Through this decision, the High Court revealed that it was
unwilling to enforce even a limited vision of equal pay for equal work in
the twenty-first century. The Chamber of Commerce had won yet an-
other victory.
I regard Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Ledbetter as her finest hour.
She challenged Congress to act and in doing so put pay equity back on
the map again."5 I testified on a panel with Ledbetter before a House
committee considering legislation to override the decision16 -legislation
that later became known as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. 17 Ledbetter's
narrative of her experience at Goodyear was compelling. She described
not just the injustice of getting paid less, despite performing as well as
the men, but also how she had been sexually harassed by one of her
13. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 637.
14. See Impact of Ledbetter v. Goodyear on the Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, of
the H Comm. on the Judiciary, I110th Cong. 9 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared
statement of Lilly Ledbetter).
15. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Once again, the ball is in
Congress' court.") .
16. See Hearing, supra note 14.
17. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-12, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
160 [Vol. 17:157
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bosses, how she feared that she would be retaliated against for refusing
his sexual advances, how difficult it was being a divorced woman raising
kids on her salary, and how the other women at the plant also experi-
enced sex discrimination, but were afraid to come forward because they
did not want to risk putting their jobs in jeopardy by suing.'8 Although
her claim for pay discrimination may have fit the formal equality/liberal
feminist mold, her personal story was much more nuanced: it defied
simple labeling and exposed familiar structural inequities in male-
dominated workplaces.
Ledbetter ultimately was victorious, even though she will never see
a penny of her jury award. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the first
piece of legislation signed by President Obama, with Ledbetter there at
his side. The legislation itself is quite modest, simply fixing the cramped
judicial interpretation of the statute of limitations in Tide VII pay dis-
crimination suits." But the Ledbetter case, like liberal feminism, carries
a more radical potential. It has given new life to additional legal reforms,
such as the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act,2 which would prohibit
employers from relying on an employee's salary in a previous position, or
on the employee's inability to negotiate for a higher salary, on other
non-performance-based reasons, in order to justify pay disparities be-
tween men and women who work in the same job. That proposed
legislation also contains a provision that would protect employees from
retaliation when they discuss their salaries with other employees. The
Ledbetter victory might also help with the passage of the long overdue
Employee Free Choice Act" -the so-called "card check"' legislation-
that would begin to level the playing field for union organizers. My
point is that there are some claims for equality that, once unleashed,
cannot easily be contained. Liberal feminism may be the tamest of the
Big Three, but it still has the capacity to produce results for women.
In reflecting on the impact of cultural and dominance feminism, let
me start by saying that although the 1980s was a bad time for the na-
tion, it was a very productive period for feminist legal theory. The
doctrinally-oriented womens rights scholarship of the 1 970s gave way to
bolder statements by feminist scholars who envisioned how law might
be transformed by feminist critiques and commitments. That period is
18. See Hearing, supra note 14, at 8, 70.
19. See Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84
TULANE L. REv. 499 (2010).
20. The House of Representatives passed the Paycheck Fairness Act in January 2009. See
155 CONG. Rac. H138 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2009); H.R_ 12, 111Ith Cong. (2009). It is
awaiting action in the Senate.
21. H.R. 1409, S. 560, 111 th Cong. (2009).
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also often thought of as a time when the divisions among feminists be-
came more visible. And certainly the tone of cultural feminism differed
from that of dominance feminism. Cultural feminists emphasized rela-
tionships, the value of intimacy, the importance of mothering and
caretaking, and other feminine activities .22 They called for a re-valuing
of women's work and womeni's contributions to our culture and envi-
sioned a better world in which the different voice of women would be
heard and acknowledged . In legal circles, this type of feminism went
down easy and soon there were a boatload of articles and studies map-
ping gender differences in what seemed to be every conceivable aspect of
human activity, what the late Mary Jo Frug called "crude Gilliganism. ,1
4
In contrast, dominance feminists had a much sharper edge. They
talked about women's lack of power, sexual subordination, and most of
all sexual violence and pornography, with much less focus on economic
issues than their liberal predecessors. 25 Their work was more vigorously
26
resisted and caricatured as man-hating and sex-hating, even while new
legal causes of action, such as sexual harassment, were quick to take
hold .2 Soon sexual harassment suits began to outnumber other types of
sex discrimination suits.2 Looking back, dominance feminism has
proved to be remarkably generative, providing the inspiration for new
laws on stalking and domestic violence and significant changes in laws
related to rape, sexual assault, and sex trafficking.
It is difficult to overestimate the impact of these three older femi-
nisms on legal feminists of all stripes. You might have heard the saying
that "we are all Legal Realists now," conveying the idea that legal realism
22. See Cii~jstLtis, supra note 1, at 53-60; Dixon, supra note 6, at 281 (citing ROBIN
WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997)).
23. See Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. Ray. 1, 39-42 (1990).
24. Mary Jo Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim 'A Different
Voice?", 15 HAv. WOMEN's L.J. 37, 50 (1992).
25. See CHAmALL~s, supra note 1, at 44-53; Dixon, supra note 6, at 282; CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARDw A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) (citing ANDREA
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981)).
26. See e.g., RENE DENFELD, THE NEW VICTORIANS: A YOUNG WOMEN'S CHALLENGE TO
THE OLD FEMINIST ORDER 27 (1995) ("Instead of promoting women's rights, to-
day's feminists are promoting man hating, separatism, and a stringent sexual
morality." ).
27. The number of sexual harassment complaints doubled in the 1 990s. See DEBORAH L.
RHODES & JENNIFER A. DROBAC, ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFES-
SION, SEx-BAsED HARASSMENT: WOnRKIACF POLICIES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 5
(2002).
28. For example, in 1997, the EEOC received 15,889 charges of sexual harassment com-
pared to 8,839 charges of other forms of sex discrimination. See http:ll
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual-harassment.cfm.
[Vol. 17:157162
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has so thoroughly permeated mainstream legal thought that it has be-
come invisible.2 I am tempted to say something along those same lines
about the core ideas of the Big Three femninisms. Liberal feminism has
become so "second nature" to courts and scholars that formal legal dis-
tinctions between men and women have now virtually disappeared .
Moreover, even scholars and activists who would chafe at being de-
scribed as either cultural or dominance feminists, or who would go to
some lengths to distance themselves from Gilligan or MacKinnon, have
often built upon the foundation laid by these two scholars.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the force of cultural feminism
being felt today is the notable success that Joan Williams has had in her
work involving discrimination against mothers in the workplace.
Williams coined the term the "maternal wall"3' to describe the obstacles
faced by mothers in the contemporary workplace and the persistence of
the work/family conflict. Although she strongly rejects the label of cul-
tural feminist, her scholarship nevertheless trades on the legacy of
cultural feminism, especially its recognition of the devaluation of
women's caretaking roles. Even in the "family values" era of the 1 980s, it
was clear to cultural feminists that mothering was unpaid and unac-
knowledged work and that any paid employment that looked like
mothering-such as teaching, nursing, social work, and the helping pro-
fessions-was similarly undervalued, stigmatized, and destined to
remain "women's work.",
32
Most importantly, cultural feminists focused attention on the stun-
ningly ungenerous family leave policies in the United States,
acknowledging the fact that a vast majority of women became mothers
at some point in their lives.33 1 think it is safe to say that the work/family
conflict has been one of the most intractable problems facing women in
the United States and it has only been exacerbated with time.
Enter Joan Williams, a feminist theorist and academic with an ac-
tivist bent. She has made a career out of dissecting the work/family
29. See ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVSM, LAWYERING & LEGAL THEORY 5 (2006)
(noting that no one can recall who first uttered the phrase because it has been re-
peated so often).
30. See CH~mALLs, supra note 1, at 24-28 (discussing elimination of sex-based classifica-
tions).
31. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relieffrr Family Care-
givers Who Are DiscriminatedAgainst On the Job, 26 HAiw. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).
32. See Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1296-
1301 (1987).
33. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohi Controversy: Equal
Treatmen, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. Ray. 513 (1983).
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conflict and translating theory into practice. Her primary focus has been
on mothers, although the primary category she deploys is "caregivers."
She has documented how mothers have been stereotyped, penalized, and
marginalized by employers who either assume working mothers are in-
competent and lack commitment once they give birth to their first or
second child, or believe that mothers should place family responsibilities
first and respond by denying pregnant women and mothers leaves or
promotions, or even firing them. " Williams's work has generated a new
genre of lawsuits-known as "family responsibility" claims 3 -brought
by both female and male employees alike who allege that their employ-
ers have treated them unfairly because of their family responsibilities.
Since the mid-1990s, these types of suits have increased exponen-
tially, by over 300 percent. Even more remarkable, they have had a
success rate of over 50 percent, well above the dismal success rate of 20
percent for other kinds of employment discrimination claims .1 6 Wil-
liams clearly touched a nerve, even though the law on the books is not
particularly receptive to caregiver claims.3 After Williams testified before
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2007, the agency
issued an Enforcement Guidance to employers detailing the ways in
which discrimination against caregivers might violate the law, despite
the lack of an express prohibition against caregiver discrimination under
federal law.3" The Guidance is not the kind of document you would
have expected to come out of the Bush administration. It gives detailed
examples of how employers discriminate against mothers with young
children, stereotype mothers during the hiring process, give biased
evaluations of a working mother's job performance, discriminate against
male caregivers, treat women of color who are caregivers less favorably
than white women, and deny opportunities to employees who have
primary responsibility for caring for disabled children, spouses, or par-
ents. It is telling that one of the stated priorities of the Obamna
administration is to publicize and find effective ways to enforce these
guidelines.
34. See Williams & Segal, supra note 31.
35. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FReD" Family Re-
sponsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2008).
36. EyaI Press, Family-Leave Values, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
37. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUJID-
ANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREAMENT OF WORKERS WITH GAREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES (May 23, 2007) (noting that federal EEO laws do not prohibit dis-
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I see the imprint of cultural feminism all over the caregiver guid-
ance and the family responsibility lawsuits, despite the liberal framework
in which anti-discrimination laws currently operate. Such claims make
sense only if one accepts that caring for family members is as valuable to
society as paid employment and that women should not have to sacrifice
their families for their work. It may be that we can hear the "different
voice" a bit more clearly now that a generation has passed since Gilligan
published her groundbreaking book.
For evidence of the continued strong impact of dominance femi-
nism on law and contemporary scholarship, one need look no further
than to the amazing scholarship of the professors on the Privacy and
Cyberspace Panel. Their contributions prove that dominance feminism
still has the power to illuminate in new contexts. Ann Bartow, for exam-
ple, employs a dominance-feminist lens to explain the importance of
pornography to the Internet, calling it the "dominant industrial force
that has driven the evolution of the Internet" and observing that the
"law of cyberspace is largely the law of pornography. 3 1 Similarly, Deb-
ora Halbert's commentary at this symposium draws heavily on
dominance feminist theory in her critique of Web sites devoted to "up-
skirting" and other forms of sexual exploitation.' Finally, Jessica
Litman's contrast and comparison of women's participation in 1 970s
"4consciousness-raising" groups to women bloggers' personal narratives
carries MacKinnon's insights on feminist methods into a new and criti-
cally important terrain where young women daily create and experience
their identities.'
11. THE NEW THREE FEMINIsMS: COMPLEXITY MEETS LAW
Like most smart daughters, the New Three feminisms that have
emerged in the past twenty years ofren take aim at the Big Three femi-
nisms and can perhaps best be understood as a response to them. All of
the newer feminisms are centrally interested in questions of personal
identity and all stress the complexity of identity: they highlight that we
39. Ann Bartow, Open Access, Law, Knowledge, Copyrights, Dominance and Subordination,
10 LEWIS & CLARKc L. REv. 869, 881 (2006).
40. "Upskirting" refers to the practice of taking photographs, often on a cell phone cam-
era, up an unsuspecting woman's skirt. There are numerous Web sites on which
" upskirters" exchange tips on how to get the best pictures. See Emine Saner, "I felt
completely violated, "THE GuARDL-s4, February 25, 2009, at 16.
41. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-
105 (1989) (discussing consciousness raising groups and the process of consciousness
raising).
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are agents and victims simultaneously; that we are women and members
of other social groups simultaneously; and that our identity is constantly
shifting and unstable because it is not natural or fixed, but socially con-
structed.
Rosalind Dixon claims that another common feature of these
newer feminisms is that they are consistently more skeptical of the ca-
pacity of law to act as a vehicle for achieving feminist change.4 She may
be right, although I still detect the lawyer's impulse to imagine and rec-
ommend legal reforms among some of these newer feminist scholars.
For example, Cheryl Hanna's 1996 article on mandated victim partici-
pation in domestic violence prosecutions in the Harvard Law Review
demonstrates a pragmatic "newer"~ feminist approach that does not give
up on legal reform. However, like the new crop of feminists, Hanna's
scholarship is not utopian; she appreciates the imperfections of the
criminal justice system, the real possibility of unintended consequences,
and understands that social practices and legal reforms can both help
and hurt different groups of women and individual women at the same
time.
One "newer" brand of feminist theory that is particularly well rep-
resented in this conference is "partial agency" feminism or "sex-positive"
feminism, the brand of feminist theory that challenges the premises of
both dominance and cultural feminism. Scholars like Katherine Franke
and Kathyrn Abrams believe that while sex is a source of danger for
women, it is also a potentially important site for pleasure, fulfillment,
and even power. 14Franke's scholarship (the sex-positive strand) has fo-
cused on what she calls "repronormative" ideologies that pressure
women into becoming mothers and that valorize reproduction over
other socially productive activities .4 ' Franke, I take it, would not be a fan
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's new caregiver
protections. She would undoubtedly fear that the new guidelines would
serve to reinforce an ideology that women are or should be mothers,
despite the gender-neutral framing of the law.
The partial-agency strand of this newer feminism stresses possibili-
ties for the exercise of women's sexual agency, rather than focusing
principally on our victimization. These partial-agency feminists regard as
42. Dixon, supra note 6, at 300.
43. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions, 8 HA1v. L. REv. 1849 (1996).
44. See e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
10 1 COLUM. L. Rxv. 181 (200 1); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wan Redux: Agenty and Coer-
cion in Feminist Legal Theoy, 95 COLUM. L. Ray. 304 (1995).
45. See Franke, supra note 44, at 197.
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a key source of gender injustice the prevailing ideologies that cast sex as
dangerous and illegitimate, particularly for certain groups of women. A
wonderful example of this approach is Deborah Denno's dissection of
the stereotypes, moralisms, and pejorative labeling associated with men-
tally challenged women when they engage in sexual activity. Denno is
very much concerned that "protection" of mentally challenged women
through specially-focused criminal laws robs them of their ability to
have consensual sex and deprives them of an important dimension of
their lives. Although she recognizes that sexual activity for mentally chal-
lenged women carries a high risk of exploitation, she is bold enough to
assert that "exposure to emotional cruelty is a risk that all individuals
take when deciding to engage in any kind of sexually intimate relation-
ship .... ,,6This desire to enlarge our conception of consensual sex
seems a far cry from Catharine MacKinnon's expansion of the bounda-
ries of sexual coercion.
I would also locate Michelle Anderson's "negotiation" approach to
defining consent in cases of alleged acquaintance rape in this "partial
agency" feminist camp,"7 although at times she seems more like a succes-
sor to, rather than a critic of, Catharine Macinnon. Significantly,
Anderson's negotiation model requires that persons who want to initiate
sexual intercourse first engage their partners actively in a decision-
making process before penetration occurs. I see rhis move as primarily
intended to bolster women's sexual agency, even if it does not criminal-
ize all forms of unwanted sex. Although negotiation models, such as
Anderson's, are still too radical for most courts, legislatures, and the gen-
eral public, it is important to recognize that they do not reach all forms
of bad sex. Anderson believes, for example, that
[Tihe law cannot do anything about those women who agree
to unpleasant penetration from their husbands because they
imagine it is their "Wifely duty"; nor can the law help a 17 year
old boy who agrees to sexual penetration that he does not de-
sire because he hopes it will prove he is a man. The law cannot
do anything about a young woman who agrees to dangerous,
unprotected penetration in order to impress her friends. It
cannot do anything for persons who, having suffered chronic
sexual abuse as children, come to think of themselves as their
46. Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv.
315, 375 (1997).
47. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 1401 (2005).
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perpetrators thought of them, and so seek to engage in degrad-
ing sexual acts."8
These telling examples of women's partial agency demonstrate the
difficulty of trying to shape the law to prevent victimization, while at
the same time recognizing women's agency. They also underscore why
newer feminist theories might be less sanguine about legal reform.
The second of the New Three feminisms has less of a presence at
this conference, although it is perhaps the best known. It goes by a few
different names: intersectional feminism, critical race feminism, or anti-
essentialist feminism."9 The key insight of these theories is that gender
hierarchies intersect and circulate with other social hierarchies such as
race, class, age, sexual orientation, disability, and immigrant status. The
"Canti-essentialist" feature of these theories resists finding commonalities
among all women, stressing that women are situated differently and ex-
perience distinctive kinds of discrimination5 0 It also recognizes that as
women we are simultaneously privileged and subordinated along differ-
ent dimensions. Anti-essentialist feminists are also more willing to
acknowledge that women can and do oppress other women. Scholars
such as KimberI6 Crenshaw" and Regina Austin"2 have stressed the im-
portance of a "bottom up" feminism centering on the experience of
women of color and working class women, whose stories tend to be
eclipsed in mainstream feminism agendas.
Although this genre of feminist scholarship has been sharply critical
of older feminisms, it has also held out the promise of diversifying the
feminist movement and keeping feminism relevant. As you know, the
feminist movement is often portrayed in the media as old-school, white,
and marginal. And we are all aware of the reluctance of younger women
to call themselves feminists. However, in a forthcoming article on social
justice feminism," Verna Williams and Kristen Kalsemn from the Univer-
sity of Cincinnati look more closely at the numbers, discussing recent
research from the Center for the Advancement of Women. A fact of im-
portance is that women of color are more aligned with feminism these
days than are white women. When asked whether being a feminist was
"Can important part of who they are," only 41 percent of white women
48. Id. at 1423.
49. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 1, at 78-92; Dixon, supra note 6, at 283-84.
50. CHAmAILAs, supra note 1, at 8 1.
51. Crenshaw, supra note 5.
52. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. Ray. 539 (1989).
53. Kristin Kalsemn & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism 1 (Univ. of Cincinnati
CoU. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 08-14, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1112105.
168 [Vol. 17:157
2010] OLD AND NEW FEMINISMS16
said yes, compared to 63 percent of black women and 68 percent of
Latina women. Similarly, black women and Latinas were far more likely
than white women to voice support for a stronger women's movement.
These numbers are not surprising when we consider that a majority of
white women voted against Barack Obama, 5 a statistic I must confess
that I still cannot wrap my mind around.
In addition to reaching out to a more inclusive group of women in
the United States, intersectional feminism and critical race feminism
have gone global. Feminist writers such as Leti Volpp, 5 Adrien Wing,'
6
and Madhavi Sunder" have critiqued the form of essentialism that tends
to set Western feminism as the standard for judging the condition of
women throughout the world. By focusing on the situation of women in
other countries and on immigrant women, this genre of feminist schol-
arship has been particularly effective in tracing the social and political
origins of what are commonly thought to be "religious" differences and
has begun to interrogate the critical role that religion plays in the lives of
women worldwide. judging from the titles of feminist articles in United
States law reviews over the last decade, it is safe to say that feminist
scholarship has stayed relevant in no small part because it has taken a
comparative and international turn.
Last but not least of the New Three feminisms is postmodern or
poststructuralist feminism. Although there has definitely been a post-
modern turn in feminist legal scholarship, feminist legal theory is not
yet as thoroughly postmodern as many other disciplines. Postmodern
scholars tend to target sex-based categories that they see as a key source
of gender injustice. In particular, they attack gender polarity and "resist
the binary." They challenge the still-dominant conception that the sexes
are opposite and that there are only two sexes, i.e., men and women."
For many of these scholars, a key concept is "gender performance" or
"identity performance," a postmodern term that focuses attention on
how a person presents herself through, among other things, dress, lan-
guage, personal style, and everyday behaviors. The path-breaking
54. Obama won 46 percent of votes from white women, compared to 68 percent from Lati-
nas and 96 percent from black women. See Center for American Women and Politics,
Gender Gap Evident in the 2008 Election, Women, Unlike Men, Show Clear Preference fer
Obama over McCain (Nov. 5, 2008), available at hrtp://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/press-.
room/lnews/documents/PressRelease_ 1 -05-O8-womensvote.pdf.
55. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 10 1 COLUM. L. Riuv. 1181 (200 1).
56. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?
Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 743 (2006).
57. Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003).
58. See Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity Politics in Tort Litigation, 88 N.C. L.
Ray. 357 (2010) (critiquing presumption of gender polarity in tort law).
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scholarship of Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, 9 along with Kenji Yo-
shino,60 for example, details how outsiders are constantly forced to make
strategic choices about how to present themselves, against a backdrop of
stereotypes and implicit assumptions about people "like them," and re-
counts how they are often required to cover or downplay their identities
to meet the demands for assimilation that employers and other institu-
tions place on them.
The objective for many postmodern scholars is to ameliorate the
oppression of individuals who do not or will not conform. Of the New
Three feminisms, postmodern feminism is the most difficult to translate
into positive legal change. Indeed, many posrmodernists have a decid-
edly deregulatory impulse, often presuming that the law is the problem
and that it serves mainly to reinforce dominant ideologies.
Even postmodern feminists, however, must also make strategic
choices. An example from anti-discrimination law well illustrates how
postmodern theory can play out in a concrete legal context. As the
speakers from the Trans Panel described, for quite some time, gay and
lesbian rights advocacy groups have pushed to amend Title VII to add
ccsexual orientation" to the current list of prohibited classifications under
federal employment discrimination law, consisting currently of race,
color, sex, religion, and national origin. The proposed legislation, known
as ENDA (the Employment Non-Discrimination Act) ,' however, has
never secured enough votes for passage. It passed in the House, but has
not yet made it through the Senate.
Nevertheless, in the last decade, gay, lesbian and transsexual plain-
tiffs; have had some success winning Title VII harassment cases. They
have convinced courts that their mistreatment amounts to a form of
impermissible "gender stereotyping," relying on the 1989 case of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,6 which held that a female accountant could not
be denied a partnership because she was too macho and rnot sufficiently
lady-like. Eventually, some courts began ruling that Price Waterhouse's
"Canti-stereotyping" theory applied to male plaintiffs who were penalized
for being too effeminate and then to openly gay plaintiffs who were
harassed because of their gender non-conformity."' One prominent Sixth
Circuit case held that a transsexual firefighter could challenge discrimi-
59. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, I11 J. CONTmp. LEGAL
ISSUEs 701 (2001); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1259 (2000).
60. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, I111 YAL.E L.J. 769 (2002).
61. H. R 3017, 111 th Cong. (2009).
62. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
63. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
64. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel Inc., 305 F.3d 1061. 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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nation against him by co-workers who objected to his expressing a more
feminine appearance at the time he was transitioning from male to fe-
male .6 ' This progressive strand in Title VII doctrine is not uniform,
however. Other courts have refused to protect such plaintiffs, ruling that
Congress never intended to afford relief in anti-gay or anti-trans cases .6
In 2007, the Democratic House struggled with ENDA. One ver-
sion of the proposed legislation provided dual protection against not
only discrimination based on sexual orientation, but on the basis of
gender identity as well. When some Congressional members balked at
including "gender identity" in the bill, Representative Barney Frank re-
lented and pushed through a bill that listed only sexual orientation,
causing much anger in the LGBT communiy.
As Trans Panel members Julie Greenberg, Marybeth Herald, and
Mark Strasser explained, however, if Congress merely adds "sexual orien-
tation" to Tidle VII, it will create another loophole in the law, leaving
out protection for trans and intersex plaintiffs. This gap is particularly
likely to occur if courts interpret ENDA as a signal that they should
stop expanding protection under the "gender stereotyping" theory of
Price Waterhouse .6 ' The important strategic question then becomes
whether efforts to add additional protected classes to Title VII should be
abandoned in favor of broader protection for specified conduct, such as
a provision that would outlaw discrimination based on an employee's
actual or perceived gender non-conforming behavior.
Such a shift from status to conduct may seem the ideal practical so-
lution, except for the uncomfortable fact that all the current versions of
ENDA also contain an exception for employer-mandated "reasonable
grooming codes," which would likely severely restrict the kind of non-
conforming gender performances that would be protected under such a
law .6 A recent decision from the "liberal" Ninth Circuit upholding an
employer's requirement that its female employees wear makeup is
65. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Schroer v. Billingron,
577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
66. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Vickers v. Fairfield
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
67. H.R 3685, 110th Cong. (2007).
68. Julie A. Greenberg, Intersex and Intrasex Debates: Building Alliances to Challenge Sex
Discrimination, 12 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 99 (2005); Marybeth Herald, Trans-
gender Theory: Reprogramming Our Automated Selves, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. Ray. 167
(2005).
69. The reasonable grooming code exception likely would continue to protect gender-
based employer dress codes that track conventional norms. See Devon Carbado et al.,
The Story of Jesperson v. Harrah's: Makeup and Women at Work, in EmPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION L~w STORIES 118 (Joel Friedman ed., 2006) (discussing "unequal
burden" test for deciding whether a grooming code is reasonable).
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testament to the resilience of binary ways of thinking about gender, es-
pecially in matters of personal appearance. 0 For that reason,
postmodern feminist scholar Gomri Ramachandran has looked beyond
anti-discrimination laws and argued for a unique right to "freedom of
dress" that she believes will protect an individual's agency in the con-
struction of her own identity
71
The battles over ENDA expose the limitations of using identity-
based and status-based legislation to combat modern forms of employ-
ment discrimination. They also demonstrate that it is exceedingly difficult
to incorporate a postmodern resistance to categories into a statutory
scheme premised on predetermined categories and protected classes. In a
recent essay, Angela Harris has called for more dialogue between trans
and feminist thinkers and has expressed the view that feminism can be
enriched by once more re-examining crucial topics, such as our under-
standings of personal identity, that have gained new layers of complexity
through the writings of trans theorists and activists.7 Particularly given
the ongoing struggle to expand civil rights law to encompass sexual mi-
norities, this area seems ripe for new feminist legal interventions.
111. THE FUTURE, OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
Two SAFE PREDICTIONS
MY crystal ball is so clouded that I will not here attempt to fathom
a guess about the big questions facing feminist legal theory, like whether
it will remain a distinctive field, or merge with other critical discourses
such as critical race theory and queer theory, or whether the divisions
among left scholars and activists will continue to deepen, so that Janet
Halley will not only Take a Break From Feminism,"3 but will become
more openly anti-feminist.
I can, however, make two safe predictions based on what I see as
two new promising lines of scholarship. The first prediction is that
postmodern feminist theory will continue to grow and give rise to inter-
esting variations on a theme. There is now a group of legal scholars-
70. See jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
71. Gomnri Ramnachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing,
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. Ray. 11 (2006).
72. See Angela P. Harris, Transgender Rights, and Whipping Girl: A Transsexual Woman
on Sexism and the Scapegoating of Femininity, 36 WOMEN'S STrUD. Q. 315 (2008)
(book review).
73. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY To TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMI-
NISM (2006).
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prominently including Frank Cooper, Nancy Dowd, and Ann
McGinley 4 -who have been applying masculinities theories to the law.
Masculinities studies is an interdisciplinary field that draws upon
feminist theory, sociology, and queer theory and investigates the differ-
ent ways masculinity is socially constructed in particular contexts, i.e.,
how men perform their masculinity. The operative term, "cmasculin-
ities," is deliberately plural to signify that different groups of men
perform their masculinity differently. Frank Cooper, for example, has
written a piece about Barack Obama called Our First Unisex President:-
Black Masculinity and Obamas Feminine Side. 5 In it he explores how, as
a black man, Obama must confront the cultural stereotype of the angry
black man and has, over a lifetime, developed an ultra-calm demeanor
to defuse that image. Cooper observed that during the campaign
Obama sometimes displayed a cooperative, conciliatory and empathetic
side-his feminine side-more so than other presidential candidates.
You may recall that some even called him "prissy." Cooper speculates
that as a heterosexual black man Obama has had more room to feminize
his gender performance without seeming too feminine. Of course, dur-
ing the campaign, Hillary Clinton also had to worry about gender
performance: she had to take care not to appear too feminine in order to
pass the "Commander-in-Chief test" and, much like Ann Hopkins in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, was also required to cry at least once in pub-
lic to prove that she was not too macho.
Feminist scholars have long been aware of the "double bind" facing
women who must struggle to find just the right mix of authority and
vulnerability to succeed in an unwelcoming environment. The fresh take
of the masculinities scholars is how they dissect and uncover what is be-
hind men's gender performances and in the process demystify
masculinity, bend gender, and deepen our understanding of relation-
ships among men which ultimately affect us all.
The second prediction I will make is that intersectional feminist
theory and its offshoots will have increasing importance in public policy.
I previously mentioned Verna Williams and Kristen Kalsem's new article
on social justice feminism.7 They use the label "social justice feminism"
to describe a kind of feminism that is closely linked to other movements
74. See Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man?": Masculinities and Police Stops, 18 Co-
LUMBL4 J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009); Nancy E. Dowd, Maculinities and Feminist Legal
Theory, 23 Wis. J. L. GENDER & Soc'y 201 (2008); Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities
at Work, 83 OR. L. REv. 359 (2004).
75. Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and Obama's
Feminine Side, 86 DEN. U. L. RE'.. 633 (2009).
76. Kalsemn & Williams, supra note 53.
20101 173
174 ~MICHIGAN JOURN L OF GENDER & LAW [o.1:5
for social justice-in the U.S. and globally-with a clear focus on inter-
locking oppressions and systems of inequality. Their description of the
features of social justice feminism does not really set it apart from inter-
sectional feminism in any significant way, and one might be tempted to
say that it is just another name for intersectional or anti-essentialist
feminism. But the social justice feminism they envision is less academic
and more applied, concentrating on concrete policy initiatives and social
activism.
Under the banner of social justice feminism, I believe that we will
see a push for more of what my colleague john Powell calls "Targeted
Universal" programs, a phrase that might at first sound like an oxymo-
ron. As he uses the term, "Targeted Universalism" is an approach that
supports the needs of the particular, while reminding us that we are all
part of the same social fabric. While framed in universal terms, it cap-
tures how people are differently situated, and targets those who are the
most marginalized. A modest, yet important, example of a targeted uni-
versal initiative is proposed legislation that would expand the Family
Medical Leave Act to require at least seven days of paid sick leave for
employees who are recovering from an illness or who need to stay home
to care for a sick family member .78 The legislation is universal because it
is not gender- or race-specific, nor is it limited to mothers. But at the
same time it is specifically targeted at lower income workers who most
often work for employers who offer no sick leave, and it helps caregivers
who cannot afford to take unpaid leave, a group composed mostly of
women and largely of women of color.
In the coming years, I am going to be looking closely at Michelle
Obama to see whether she publicly embraces social justice feminism in a
way that resonates with women and the American public. A promising
sign is her appointment of Jocelyn Frye from the National Partnership
for Women and Families (formerly the Women's Legal Defense Fund) to
be her policy director .7 1 1 can predict that if there are feminist successes
on the policy front, feminist legal writers will track these changes and
theorize about them, something we have been waiting to do for quite
some time. As it has in the past, practice will drive theory and will keep
feminist legal theory alive. t
77. John A. Powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DEN. U. L. REv. 785
(2009).
78. Healthy Families Act, H.R 2460, S. 1152, 111th Cong. (2009).
79. Rachel L. Swarns, Friendship Born at Harvard Goes on to White House, N.Y. TimEs,
Mar. 10, 2009, at Al7.
174 Vol. 17:157
